Files
Download Full Text (695 KB)
Description
Quantum computers use classical embedded processors to sequence control pulses. On STM32-class microcontrollers, firmware emits operation classes (gates (X, Y, Z), measurements (MEAS), and timing barriers (WAIT)) at precise intervals. If execution time depends on a secret value, an attacker with a logic analyzer can recover that secret. This classical control plane is a largely overlooked attack surface. This work presents a simulation-based investigation of timing side-channel leakage in quantum-control firmware sequencers.
Publication Date
2026
Recommended Citation
Basnet, Darpan; Bista, Anshu; and Vaidyan, Varghese, "Hardware Side-Channel Security of Quantum System Controllers: A Timing Attack Perspective" (2026). Annual Research Symposium. 72.
https://scholar.dsu.edu/research-symposium/72